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ABSTRACT – The paper argues that there is good
reason to doubt that virtue-based approaches to the
question of justice can adequately come to grips
with sophistic uses of the political lie – especially
when sophistic thinking is stretched to the point of
thoroughgoing moral skepticism, or well beyond
that to outright moral nihilism and its cynical uses.
To counter such uses, I turn to Kant’s most
influential discussion of lying, which is found in his
1797article entitled “Of a Supposed Right to Lie from
Philanthropy.” Although I maintain that Kant’s
particular moral argument against Constant is
flawed, I argue that the specifically political position
that Kant’s general juridical argument supports is
sound. I thereby show how Kant’s account of the
conditions for the possible conformity of politics
with principles of right does effectively establish
that an impeachable act of lying categorically
requires impeachment and prosecution for
wrongdoing.
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RESUMO – O artigo mostra que há boas razões para
questionar se abordagens embasadas na virtude
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dar conta dos usos sofistas da mentira política –
especialmente quando o pensamento sofista
estende-se ao ponto culminante do ceticismo moral,
ou para além do gritante niilismo moral e seus usos
cínicos. A fim de refutar tais usos, recorre-se à mais
influente discussão sobre a mentira em Kant, que
se encontra em seu artigo de 1797 “Sobre o Suposto
Direito de Mentir por causa da Filantropia.” Embora
mantenha que o particular argumento moral
kantiano contra Constant seja deficiente, o artigo
argumenta que a posição especificamente política
no argumento jurídico genérico de Kant é defen-
sável. Mostra-se, portanto, que o relato kantiano das
condições para a possível conformidade da política
com os princípios do Direito efetivamente estabe-
lece que um ato de mentir é passível de impeachment
e categoricamente exige o impeachment e a devida
execução jurídica de tal delito.
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1 A few words may serve here to clarify the title of this article. ‘Truthiness’ (as distinguished from
‘truthfulness’) is a term coined by the US-American television satirist Stephen Colbert. Colbert generally
uses this term to characterize a highly vulgarized conception of truth that in recent years has often
played a dominant role in United States political discourse. ‘Truthiness’ signifies whatever a person may
claim to know intuitively and with utter disregard for analyseable evidence, logical consistency, intellectual
coherence, or even standards of common human decency. I first presented a version of the present text
in Spring 2006 at a New York State conference on the idea of public philosophy. As the title implicitly
suggests, my paper was (and still is) meant as a philosophic tribute to Colbert, whose nightly television
program, broadcast nationally, has steadfastly countered the forces that have made such effective of the74
Two maxims of political reasoning we can count on, whether we like them or
not: The worse things get to be, the more reason there is for the powerful to lie
publicly in order to get what is ever more useful for the use of their power. And the
more power the powerful get to have, the greater the power that is yielded by the
public lies which the powerful have the all more reason to use the worse things get
to be. So what? What, if anything, is wrong with the ‘more reason’ that features in
sayings like these? The powerful have always lied whether the uses of reason have
been public or not. That is because things have always been bad enough – or good
enough, for that matter – for lying to be useful to the craft of ruling. This was true to
begin with, and there is no reason to think that it will not always be so. The means
of lying may differ greatly under different historical conditions. But lying itself is
just a cold fact of social nature as far as the human condition goes, no matter how
many different historical forms of social reproduction we may end up running through.
(In this regard, lying is rather like labor and its variant existence-forms.) Even under
public conditions ideal for the achievement of political autonomy and universal
democratic consensus concerning the human good (or human goods), we would still
be able to lie to ourselves. And why not do it if it is useful, publicly and democratically
speaking? Besides, cannot lying signal virtue as well as have good consequences
for those who rule and, conceivably, for those who are ruled?
I
Consider what Plato says in Book IV of the Republic about the possibility of
contriving ‘one of those useful lies... a single noble lie that would, preferably, persuade
even the rulers themselves; but failing that, the rest of the city’ 2  (414b-c)3. The
point of the noble lie, of course, is to persuade subjects who are to be educated to
rule that they by nature possess the capacity to become rulers to a far greater degree
than anyone who by nature is to be ruled by those who are supposed to have such a
capacity. The belief in one’s own greater natural capacity that the noble lie is intended
to engender and support is especially important for those who are enjoined to rule
but may not seek material advantage for themselves. If you are supposed to touch
no gold, let alone have it in your pockets, then, if you are going to develop the
character traits and acquire the knowledge necessary for proper ruling, you had
principle of truthiness in their acquisition and maintenance of preponderant political power. On April 29,
2006, Colbert was the featured guest speaker at the Association of White House Correspondents Dinner
in Washington DC. In the presence of President George W. Bush and many of the most influential figures
of the Washington political establishment, Colbert gave a highly detailed description of Bush’s publicly
displayed thought processes and capacity for judgment in terms of the definitional account of truthiness
given above. Colbert’s satirical (not to mention courageous) speech had an extraordinary impact in the
North American political context. Frank Rich of the New York Times has called Colbert’s Whitehouse
Correspondents Dinner performance the defining moment of the United States midterm election year.
2 The full original passage, including the phrase elided, is as follows: tis an oun hêmin, ên d’ egô, mêchanê
genoito tôn pseudôn tôn en deonti gignomenôn, hôn dê nun elegomen, gennaion  ti hen pseudomenous
peisai malista men kai autous tous archontas, ei de mê, tên allên polin;
3 I quote here the recent translation by C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2004),
which is based on S. R. Sling’s new Greek text: Platonis Rempublicam (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).75
better know that it is useful for you to believe that you should act as if you had gold
in your veins. And it is good, as well as merely useful or opportune, if you can be
persuaded to believe in the necessity of your belief in your innate capacity for
excellence in ruling while you also happen to know that this belief is based on a
fiction – though it would be even better, of course, if you could be persuaded that
your false belief had some foundation in truth.
This reading of what is implicit in the opening lines of Plato’s myth of the metals
is, of course, contentious. First of all, it can certainly be questioned whether the
employment of ‘lie’ and ‘lies’ provides for a conceptually accurate rendering of pseudos
and the participial form of pseudesthai that Plato uses in the lines quoted above in
translation4. Thus, one may want to maintain that the very expression ‘noble lie’
amounts to a contradictio in adiecto when applied within the normative framework
of Plato’s moral philosophy5. Or at least one will insist that the force of the expression
should be softened to something like, ‘convenient fiction,’ edle Täuschung, beau
mensonge, nobile menzogna – or indeed, to ‘noble and generous fiction’6.
In support of this desired softening effect, one can call attention to the connection
between the opportune or needful falsehood at issue in the phrase tôn pseudôn tôn
en deonti gignomenôn and a pivotal distinction that Plato draws at the end of the
second book of the Republic. I refer here to the distinction between, on the one hand,
the ‘true lie’ or ‘true falsehood’ – i.e., ‘what is truly false’ (alêthôs pseudos-382a) –
and, on the other hand, the ‘lie in words’ or ‘falsehood in words’ (to en tois logois
pseudos-382c). Insofar as it is an affection of the soul, what is truly false embodies a
lie that is quite properly hated or despised by both human beings and the gods. Yet
falsehood in words, which unavoidably features in our use of myths, is to be deemed
unworthy of hatred or contempt just because of its usefulness to human beings in
the well-ordered city. To be sure, the latter type of falsehood is utterly useless to the
gods under any conditions. Gods, who are altogether simple in word as well as in
deed, simply have no need to deceive by lies involving false appearances and false
likenesses of the things that are and events that have been. But given the ruling
function that must be attributed the guardian class as a whole within the city,
understood ideally as a political whole established discursively in reasoning7,
falsehood in words can perfectly well be thought of as useful for the proper formation
of guardians. Falsehood in words is useful for this purpose precisely because it is an
imitation of the true lie as an affection of the human soul – in other words, because
it is a mere image consequent upon this ‘pure lie’ or ‘falsehood unmixed’ (akraton
4 My use of ‘lie’ and ‘lies’ accords with Reeves’ rendering of the relevant terms (note 2 above).
5 Cornford explicitly argues this point. See The Republic of Plato, translated and introduced by Francis
Macdonald Cornford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 68, 106 (note).
6 See Plato, Der Staat, translated by Rudolf Rufener and edited by Olof Gigon (Zürich & München: Artemis
Verlag, 1973), p. 204; idem, La république, translated by Emile Chambray, in Platon: Oeuvres complètes
vol. 6 (Paris: Société D’Édition Les Belles Lettres, 1965), 414b-c; idem, La Repubblica, translated by
Giuseppe Lozza (Milan: Arnoldo Mondadori, 1990), p.265; idem, The Republic, translated by R. E. Allen
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 414b-c
7 Cf. Rep. 592a.76
pseudos-382c). For it is by means of falsehoods (or lies) in words that ruling guardians
are capable of making what is truly false as much as possible like the true, thus
rendering falsehood as such useful to us as beings who are ignorant of things that
gods know to be true quite independently of the use of falsehoods in words to call
forth the imagery of myth.
Fair enough. Plato can quite handily be defended against the onslaught of
defenders of the “open society” who are incensed by the propagandistic tone of
Plato’s use of the ‘Phoenecian story’ (414c) in Book IV of the Republic, especially
against anachronistically disposed defenders whose expertise in dealing with classic
philosophical texts may leave a good deal to be desired. So let us just grant the
point that lies (or falsehoods) can be rendered useful to us insofar as at least some of
us are capable of using lies (falsehoods) to make that which is not truly false into
something like that which is true. Let us accept as well that these useful lies (or
useful falsehoods, deceptions, and the like) can be noble, and even generous, to the
extent that mythological content generated by falsehood in words can be made as
much as possible like the true for the purpose of establishing a pattern of political
order consonant with the nature of the human being – or, for that matter, for the
purpose of establishing a paradigm of order consonant with purportedly different
natures of different types of human being  8. Yet however persuasive or unpersuasive
rulers may be expected to find their own founding political mythologies, I strongly
suspect that a basic logical difficulty underlies, and thus undercuts, Plato’s use of
the myth of the metals in his account of justice – and this quite apart from the other
concerns that such myth-making enterprises might give rise to (which the
conservatively inclined may in any event want to chalk up to political correctness
on the part of the liberally squeamish) 9.
In order for the noble lie to be serviceable for Plato’s account of justice in the
human being and in the city, Plato must already have demonstrated conclusively
the falsity of a key claim which underpins the particular sophistic conception of
justice treated in the first book of the Republic, i.e., the conception represented by
Thrasymachus’ view of justice as the advantage of the stronger (to tou kreittonos
sumpheron – 338c). Of course, the overall argument of the Republic by no means
presupposes the complete dismantlement of Thrasymachus’ general view of justice
by end of Book I. Indeed, Plato’s entire line of argument after the first book as good
as begins with the radicalizing clarification and strengthening of that very view10.
Yet there is, I believe, one sophistic claim that Plato must show to be wholly untenable
prior to the radicalization of Thrasymachus’ position if the Republic’s overall argument
is to be set up properly to achieve its goals, namely, to account for what justice is in
8 That is to say: consonant with the natures that can be ranked in accordance with the different natural
capacities that human beings are supposed to have for doing different types of work or fulfilling different
appropriate functions within the political whole.
9 For historical antecedents of this ever more strident conservative inclination, see, e.g., Leo Strauss, The
City of Man (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 101-103; Allan Bloom, Plato’s Republic (New York: Basic
Books, 1968), pp. 366-369.
10 See Rep. 357a-367e.77
both the soul and the city, and to prove that the just and most fully virtuous human
being lives best and is therefore eudaimon. I have in mind here Thrasymachus’ claim
that the craft (or art) of ruling is always practiced to the advantage of those who
rule, i.e., ‘the stronger’ understood as the ruling element in the city. Against this
position, Plato has to establish, as a conceptual as well as linguistic point, that every
ruler qua ruler can practice that craft of ruling only to the advantage, or good, of
those who are ruled (i.e., the weaker). But in the key inference step of his refuting
argument, Plato concludes merely that ‘no type of craft or rule provides what is
advantageous for itself’11 (346e-italics mine). As far as the rest of the Republic’s
argument on the nature of justice is concerned, this step leaves the sophist with
two crucial countering options – with two massive weapons, as it were, in the arsenal
of sophistic persuasion for the advantage of the stronger. First, the Thrasymachean
sophist could quite legitimately point out that Plato simply does not establish the
required conceptual point, which, after all, pertains to the relation between ruler
and ruled, and not to the relation between the craft practiced by the ruler who knows
the craft and this craft itself. Plato (Socrates) and Thrasymachus had previously
agreed that no craft or knowledge ‘considers or enjoins what is advantageous for
itself, but what is advantageous for the weaker, which is ruled by it’ 12 (342c-d). But
this does not entail that no ruler can properly be said to rule when the ruling is
performed for that ruler’s own good, as long as it is possible for a craft of this type to
be practiced for the good of the craft’s practitioner. This brings us to the second
sophistic option. The Thrasymachean sophist could argue that the craft of ruling is
relevantly similar to the craft that even Plato must recognize as something practiced
for the good of the practitioner, to wit, the craft that aims at remunerative gain for
the practitioner (misthôtikê) 13.
Taken together, these options put the sophist in a position to maintain, at
minimum, three things: (1) the craft of ruling can be practiced exclusively for the good
of the ruler or ruling class; (2) because such a practice is possible, it simply does not
follow that a ruler (or class of rulers) must act for the good of the ruled if she is to
function properly as a ruler; and, consequently, (3) any distinction which one might
want to draw between (a) the lies that are useful for efficacious ruling and (b) the
virtue-based and virtue-enabling noble lie (i.e., the lie that both exhibits the virtuous
disposition of the ruler and allows for the cultivation of that disposition in those
who are similarly endowed) is simply beside the point – unless, that is, the distinction
can be reduced to purely quantitative terms: the more useful the lie, the nobler it is.
In many (if indeed not most) circumstances, that will mean ‘the stronger the ruler, the
bigger the lie; and the bigger, of course, the better, provided it makes the ruler stronger’.
So what does all this have to do with justice? If justice can be understood as
‘the advantage of the stronger,’ and if the craft of ruling can be practiced in order to
11 oukoun, ô Thrasumache, touto êdê dêlon, hóti oudemía technê oudè archê to hautêi ôphélimon paraskeuázei,…
12 ouk ara epistêmê ge oudemía to tou kreíttonos súmpheron skopeî oud’ epitáttei, allà to tou hêttonos te kaì
archoménou hupò heautês.
13 Cf. Strauss, The City and Man, pp. 79-85; Bloom, The Republic of Plato, pp. 332-334.78
maximize this advantage, then that is just what justice can be. If this is a matter of
opinion, then the opinion is certainly good enough for the powerful to get cracking.
Don’t just round up the usual suspects – ask anyone who wants to rule! You can be
quite multi-partisan about this, at least in the event that you can find somebody
who both wants the power he doesn’t yet have (or no longer has) and is able to
articulate a coherent thought about ruling as the effective use of power. At any rate,
we just know that the more powerful – the stronger – always do get cracking since
this is perfectly obvious on empirical grounds. And because they know this, too,
they also know that lying is, more often than not, a perfectly good way for them to
get cracking and keep on going. As Thrasymachus himself showed with such
admirable clarity, it really makes no difference whether the ‘they’ (i.e., ‘the stronger’)
is one, a few, or the many. Indeed, to bring the point at issue a bit more up to date, it
is conceivable that the ruling power can be, or represent, everyone combined. And
although we may think this is pure fantasy as far as our political reality is concerned,
we can still endorse the democratic or republican principle that the conception
represents. So at least for those of us who can know, we all ought to know that big
lies can be very useful, and therefore exceptionally noble (not to mention generous)
– especially if we can all somehow hoodwink one another most all of the time through
some public use of reason. Happily, this conclusion seems to have found strong
backing in a number of reality-based procedures of prudential reasoning. Some of
these procedures of action guidance have on occasion been identified under the
heading of “faith-based policy making”. But that obviously depends on a misnomer
since the overriding action-guiding principle involved is transparently this: as long
as we can fool some of the people all of the time, there is (inductively) no good reason
to believe we cannot always fool all of the people that we really need to fool in order
to be getting on with what we really want to do, namely, rule to our advantage in
accordance with our superior strength. And it matters not whether the ‘we’ really is
everyone combined, or merely represents the one, the few, or the many who know
what it really means to rule fools. Ridiculous? Well, hardly. Just look at the noble
and generous effects of the news media’s talking heads! A lot of those characters
believe even their own stories. And if these stories – these contemporary urban myths
– are the weapons of mass deception that support the lies of the stronger, then we
can all be suckered down together with guiltless grins on our faces. So in at least
one respect, Plato did get it right after all: justice does make us happiest. And the
Thrasymachean options mentioned above make it possible to enforce the link
between the ideas of justice and eudaimonia that, as has often been acknowledged,
is so tenuously maintained in Plato’s own theory of justice.
It would be a fine thing if, in the course of the Republic’s extended argument,
Plato had effectively dealt with these two options14. I don’t believe that he did,
14 The further question is whether the overall argument of the Republic can firmly ground the link that
Plato wants to establish between justice and eudaimonia (see Rep. 366b-367e, 443.b-445d, 588a-592b,
612c-614a, 618b-619b) even if we assume that he successfully removes these Thrasymachean options.
But I do not pursue this issue.79
though. Nor, more importantly, do I think that the Platonic theory of justice offers
the conceptual resources for dealing adequately with those sophistic options. Indeed,
as much as I revere Plato and Aristotle, I tend to doubt that virtue ethical approaches
in general can properly come to grips with the implications of such options, especially
when sophistic thinking is stretched to the point of thoroughgoing moral skepticism,
or well beyond that to outright moral nihilism and its cynical uses by the intellectually
unhinged 15. My doubt, of course, gives rise to any number of highly contentious
claims. And given current political realities, it is – and is fully intended to be –
combative. Before further developing my line of assault, however, let me say just a
few things in order to illuminate my position somewhat better.
In expressing my doubt, I am not suggesting that there is no possible variant
of “agent-centered” or “agent-based” moral philosophy that can offer a coherent
and non-question-begging account of “right action” when it assumes that an action
is right if, and only if, it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in a
given set of circumstances. Nor do I even wish to imply that such an account, when
grounded in this assumed biconditional, is incapable of furnishing prescriptions for
rule-governed (or indeed for law-determined) action16. Still, it is far from obvious to
me how any theory of right action can effectively counter the ultimate force of the
sophistic options that I have been concerned to clarify if it must jointly satisfy the
following two conditions, which I take to be essential features of every plausible
form of virtue ethics. First, its account of the moral qualities and deontic modalities
of human actions must be conceptually linked to what the virtuous agent, however
described, would do when acting in character. Second, its determination of what an
agent answering to this description would do in given circumstances must be
logically tied to some specification of a concept of eudaimonía17. I take it, then, that
Plato’s moral philosophy is just as much subject to these combined requirements as
Aristotle’s ethics is, together with its Scholastic and contemporary Neo-Aristotelian
derivatives. And I do not see how any coherent specification of what eudaimonía is
can counter the sophistic options in question as long as one supposes that the
account of the deontic properties of actions has to be tied, in virtue of the very idea
of eudaimonía (however specified), to some description of the own-good or own-
happiness of the agent who practices the art of ruling.
Note well that, in stating this last point, I am not contending that classical
forms of virtue ethics and its contemporary offshoots are inherently egoistic insofar
as they are eudaimonistic. I take such a view to be mistaken18. I hold merely no
15 On this increasingly extreme state of affairs, see Shadia Drury, Leo Strauss and the American Right (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988); idem., The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan,
2005). For an opposing assessment of Strauss, see Robert Pippin, Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian
Variations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 209-233.
16 On this, see chapters 1 and 8-11 of Rosalind Hursthouse’s Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
17 Cf. Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, p. 74; also Rosalind Hursthouse, “Are Virtues the Proper Starting Point for
Morality,” in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, edited by James Dreier (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers,
2006), esp. pp. 106-112.
18 On this, see Julia Annas, “Virtue Ethics”, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, edited by David
Copp (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 522-523.80
virtue-theoretic account of right action, whether classical or contemporary,
can effectively counter the skeptical and antimoralist options made available
by the way of thinking that is illustrated by Plato’s treatment of Thrasymachus.
My position, of course, may not be especially disquieting to the contemporary
proponent of virtue ethical reasoning, who will likely be only too happy to
call attention to two further defining characteristics of his classical ancestry.
The first of these further characteristics lies in the assumption that the notion of
living virtuously is built into the interpretation of happiness as eudaimonía, and
the second is found in the correlative assumption that a central task of philosophical
ethics is to provide for a normative specification of eudaimonía in terms of the virtues
of character that furnish subjective enabling conditions of ‘acting well’ or ‘doing
well’ 19. Given these crucial features of traditional ethical theory, one may well
maintain that neither the skeptic nor the antimoralist (let alone the ethical egoist)
needs to be taken all too seriously since ethical inquiry is in any event relevant
only to the kind of agent who is, in some sense, already committed to an ideal of
the virtuous life that the philosophical account of eudaimonía is supposed to
enable that agent to make good sense of.
Fair enough. This line of reply seems unobjectionable as far as it goes. Yet the
whole problem, as I see it, is that it just does not go nearly far enough. In an age of
extremes like our own epoch, historically standard liberal, conservative, and even
left-leaning appropriations of Western philosophy’s dominant tradition of virtue
ethics arguably do not provide an adequate basis of response to the non-modernist,
post-modernist, antimodernist, post-anti-modernist, anti-post-modernist, etc.,
extremes that derive so much of their attractiveness and historical force from
premodern repudiations of the normative core content of that same tradition of
virtue ethical reasoning, notably, the ancient mainline tradition of Western
philosophical ethics20. Above all, I am not persuaded that contemporary
appropriations of this particular tradition furnish anything like a sufficiently sound
platform for dealing normatively with the politically most potent offshoots of
the way of thinking against which Plato directed his main energies. But enough
of this – I will not further belabor these sweeping historical pronouncements. I have
brought them into the discussion merely in order to shed some light on why I am
willing to make more than a two-millennium leap from Plato’s time to the
revolutionary epoch of Immanuel Kant.
It is specifically in view of the relationship between Kant’s treatment of the
permissibility of lying and his theory of right that I will construct the primary political
argument of this paper. For the Kantian doctrine of right, as a theory grounded in
the concept of Recht, is not subject to the joint requirements of eudaimonistic ethics
delineated above, and its normative scope is therefore not restricted by the
definitional features just mentioned.
19 On these crucial features, see Annas, “Virtue Ethics”, pp. 520-523.
20 The underlying reference here is to Eric Hobsbawm’s  The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-
1991 (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).81
II
There can be little doubt that Kant has decisively influenced contemporary
assessments of lying in the public domain, i.e., lying in the domain relevant to the
public use of reason.
Kant’s most influential discussion of lying –and unquestionably his best-known
discussion – is found in his late article of 1797 entitled “Of a Supposed Right to Lie
from Philanthropy” (Über ein vermeintliches Recht aus Menschenliebe zu Lügen). The
article contains Kant’s highly critical treatment of the views on duty, rights, and the
permissibility of lying that Benjamin Constant had previously directed against Kant’s
conception of truthfulness as a juridical duty or duty of right (Rechtspflicht). According
to Constant, there is of course a duty to tell the truth, but this duty cannot be
unconditional. For telling the truth is a duty only in relation to someone who has a
right to it; and where there is no relevant right, there can be no corresponding duty.
Most everyone here will be quite familiar with the most striking story line involved
in Kant’s refuting argument. Someone hell-bent on murder appears at the door asking
if the intended victim is in the house. If you lie, stating that the would-be murderer’s
target is out and about, then you are legally responsible for all of the consequences
that might arise from your act of lying, including all of its unforeseen and undesirable
consequences. Thus, if the prospective victim has left the house unnoticed, and the
murderer ends up finding him outside and manages to do him in, then
you can by right [mit Recht] be prosecuted as the author of his death; for if you had told the
truth to the best of your knowledge, the neighbors might have come and apprehended him
while he was searching the house for his enemy and the deed would have been prevented’21
(8:427 – italics mine)22.
I don’t know about your neighbors. If my neighbors were that vigilant about
what goes on privately inside my house, I would likely have moved out long before
any murderer came a-knocking at my door, which makes Kant’s implicit appeal to
probabilistic thinking rather more tenuous than it might otherwise be. One could
perhaps say something in this regard about Kant’s Königsberg neighbors, or even
something of somewhat broader scope about the customs of late eighteenth-century
European neighbors, but I cannot see how that would be particularly helpful at the
present juncture. The problem is that, intuitively, the particular argument in question
somehow looks a bit thin to begin with; and the more one thinks about it, the thinner
it looks. It is not difficult to figure out why that should be. Taken just as Kant presents
it, the argument in question evidently hinges on a thought that is less than remarkable
21 So kannst du mit Recht als Urheber des Todes desselben angeklagt werden. Denn hättest du die Wahrheit,
so gut du sie wußtest, gesagt: so wäre vielleicht der Mörder über dem Nachsuchen seines Feindes im
Hause von herbeigelaufenen Nachbarn ergriffen und die That verhindert worden.
22 Kant’s is cited according to the given volume and numbers of Kants gesammelte Schriften, Königlich
Preußiche (now Deutsche) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now De Gruyter], 1902-.
The Kant passages quoted in English are generally in keeping with Mary Gregor’s translations in Immanuel
Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), although I substantially alter
these renderings in view of Kant’s German when I find it appropriate to do so.82
for its initial transparency. Kant seems to move from the claim that one is juridically
responsible (auf rechtliche Art verantwortlich) for all of the consequences that might
arise from one’s own act of lying to the (not obviously coherent) notion that one is subject
to prosecution because of being causally responsible for an event caused by another.
There are, of course, many questions that can be raised in this context about
the nature of agent causation. There are also many issues that Kant’s argument
generates concerning the criteria by which we should set about distinguishing
between causing, doing, intending, and allowing harm and wrongdoing. Yet it is, I
think, safe to say that the argument, as just summarized, is simply not refined enough
for such questions to be worth bringing to bear without further ado. So if Kant’s
reasoning concerning the connection between lying, legal responsibility, and
warranted prosecution is to have a leg to stand on, we need something more to go
on. Fortunately the text under scrutiny seems to offer some promising considerations
in this regard23. Two paragraphs further on, Kant seeks to support his view of
truthfulness as a strict duty, and thus his claim that it is a juridical requirement of
practical reason to tell the truth under all possible conditions for action, by exposing
what he takes to be a crucial piece of conceptual confusion that underpins Constant’s
entire line of argument. Kant holds that Constant confuses ‘an action by which
someone harms (nocet) another by telling a truth he cannot avoid admitting with an
action by which he wrongs (laedit) another’ 24 (8:428). Thus, if the distinction between
harming (Schaden) and doing wrong (Unrecht tun) is respected, then (in keeping
with the unwelcome door-knocking situation already described) two substantive
points can be made against the type of position that Constant wants to defend.
First, we can see that the agent put on the spot has ‘the strictest duty to truthfulness
in statements that he cannot avoid making, though they may harm himself or others’25
(8:428). Second, we can discern that, in telling the truth in accordance with this
requirement of strict duty, such an agent does not do harm to the other who suffers
it. For it is merely an accident (casus) if anyone is harmed as the result of making a
truthful statement; and it is this accident that causes that harm, in the event that
anyone actually ends up being harmed26.
23 This is fortunate because, except for the article under consideration, I know of no passage in Kant’s
collected works that supports the view of the authorship of human action that Kant needs in order to
make his argument, as summarized, work. Twenty-three volumes of the Prussian Academy Edition of
Kant’s works contain publications, sketches, and fragments from Kant’s own hand. Apart from the piece
at hand, only four passages from this mass of materials have some bearing on the view of authorship at
issue (see 6:84, 6:223, 6:227, 6:431); and none of these furnishes any basis for the inference move from
juridical responsibility for the consequences of one’s action to the authorship of an event for which the
deed of another agent is causally responsible.
24 So verwechselte »der französische Philosoph« die Handlung, wodurch Jemand einem Anderen schadet
(nocet), indem er die Wahrheit, deren Geständniß er nicht umgehen kann, sagt, mit derjenigen, wodurch
er diesem Unrecht thut (laedit).
25  Jeder Mensch aber hat nicht allein ein Recht, sondern sogar die strengste Pflicht zur Wahrhaftigkeit in
Aussagen, die er nicht umgehen kann: sie mag nun ihm selbst oder Andern schaden.
26 Es war bloß ein Zufall (casus), daß die Wahrhaftigkeit der Aussage dem Einwohner des Hauses schadete,
nicht eine freie That (in juridischer Bedeutung)... Er selbst thut also hiermit dem, der dadurch leidet,
eigentlich nicht Schaden, sondern diesen verursacht der Zufall (8:428).83
Needless to say, again, there are quite a few issues in this line of thought that
stand in need of some sorting. But let us keep things as simple as possible, thereby
making Kant’s case as strong as it can be made to be. Let us grant the underlying
assumption that is needed in order to make sense of Kant’s use of the distinction
that he wants to draw between doing harm and causing harm. In other words, let
us accept as unproblematic this proposition: the agent who by telling the truth causes
the accident that causes harm to another is an agent that does no harm, and
consequently does no wrong, to the one who suffers the harm caused by that very
same agent, i.e., the agent who causes that accident by telling the truth.
The content of this proposition may stick in the throat a bit before it slides down.
But it does furnish an assumption that Kant needs if he is to make his point against
Constant, i.e., the point that one does not, and indeed cannot, do wrong to another
by telling the truth, even if one thereby causes harm to another. But exactly therein
lies the rub in Kant’s understanding of the relationship between juridical
responsibility, causal agency, and prosecutorial warrant. The distinction that Kant
needs in order to establish that acts by which someone is harmed are not necessarily
acts by which someone is wronged – i.e., the distinction between doing and causing
harm – is precisely the distinction which excludes that an agent is necessarily
prosecutable (anklagbar) if she is the author of an event caused by the criminal deed
of another. If I am the agent who causes the accident that in fact enables another to
wrong someone else, then I am (in some sense) the author (Urheber) of an event in
which, or by which, someone is harmed as the result of my act. Yet I cannot possibly
be the author of an event by which, or in which, someone is wronged by me if I am
the author of that event only insofar as my act causes harm to another (or more
precisely: only insofar as my act causes the accident that causes harm to another).
Event authorship is by no means a sufficient condition for prosecutorial warrant in
the event of wrongdoing if the author of an event does no wrong.
What follows from this? Many things follow, but several things are particularly
striking if we consider once again the story line that Kant wants to run. If we combine
this consideration with the inherently reasonable background expectation that any
theory of practical reason must be able to come to grips with the relation between
ends of action and the means of achieving such ends through action, we arrive at
two fairly straightforward conclusions. These are perhaps most agreeably formulated
taking the first-person standpoint. First, it seems that I would have to be either a
hare-brained fool or just a downright vicious ass – or, more realistically, a combination
of both – if I failed to try to prevent a deed that will foreseeably result in someone
being wrongfully killed, and I failed in this endeavor simply because I thought that
the means of my act of prevention (i.e., my lying) could, unforeseeably, result in my
being the author of an event involving harm to another. Second, even if I accept
that, strictly speaking, I would do no juridical wrong to the prospective victim by
telling the truth (a rather large ‘if,’ incidentally – see below), I can still know that I
would be an utter nincompoop if I were to tell the truth while hoping (praying?) that
my neighbors are virtuous and fleet-footed enough, and are also obsessively vigilant
enough about what goes on privately at my doorway, to be willing and able run into84
my house and nab the murderous knocker before the dastardly deed is done. In any
event, I can hardly be prosecuted for doing wrong whether or not my act causes, or
can cause, the accident that is the cause of unforeseen harm to the victim insofar as
it happens to furnish the occasion for another agent’s act of wrongdoing. That
prospective victim is not my victim, even if it should ultimately turn out that I am
(accidentally) one of the authors of his demise. End of story, though probably also
the beginning of the finding of fact, of course.
So what can we say about Kant’s views on lying and legal (or more precisely:
juridical [rechtlich]) responsibility? If we are inclined to engage in psychological
speculation, one thing to say might be that unfortunate things can happen when a
thinker of even Kant’s caliber is pressed to finish and send off a journal article directed
against a reputable and influential critic when he has more pressing and more
interesting things in mind to do. (I have in mind here mainly the developments in
Kant’s metaphysics of nature that are exhibited in the middle and later fascicle
components of the Opus postumum27). But this is hardly the only thing to say, and is
certainly not the most interesting claim to assert, if we focus on the political point
that Kant has in mind when putting forward his considerations on the strict duty of
truthfulness. To understand this point, we must first be clear about a systematic
issue of prime importance. For Kant, the question of the permissibility or
impermissibility of lying that his 1797 article treats is one that concerns specifically,
and moreover exclusively, the systematic domain of the theory of right (Recht). What
exactly does this mean?
The key formula of Kant’s basic principle of right is found in the Doctrine
of Right of 1796: ‘Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom
in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of the power
of choice (Willkür) of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with
a universal law’ 28 (6:230). According to this formula, the basic metaphysical principle
of Kant’s juridical philosophy applies normatively to all actions by which external
relations between persons can be established. This universal principle employs
the term ‘right’ to express a concept of freedom; and it specifies this concept
in terms of the possibility of reciprocally law-determined relations governing
all persons’ powers of choice: the coexistence of everyone’s freedom in accordance
with a universal law. The universal law of right, which derives directly from
this principle of external freedom, furnishes an imperative that places upon
every given agent (qua person) the unconditional obligation to restrict her freedom
to the types of action by which the exercise of everyone’s external freedom of
action is possible.
This fundamental law of right – ‘so act externally that the free use of your power
of choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal
27 On this, see chapters 8 and 9 of my Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge (Berkeley/Los
Angeles/London: University of California Press, 2000).
28 Eine jede Handlung ist recht, die oder nach deren Maxime die Freiheit der Willkür eines jeden mit
jedermanns Freiheit nach einem allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen kann. (6:30)85
law’ 29 (6:231) – is the universal prescription of reason that grounds the entire system
of juridical duties presented in the Doctrine of Right as a whole. This doctrine is a
specifically juridical theory (ius). Fundamentally, it is a metaphysical account of strict
right (ius strictum), which concerns only the conditions of external freedom under
law. Thus, not only does it abstract from all needs and all particular ends that rational
agents may have in mind with objects that they may want to have. It also abstracts
from the conditions of inner freedom in which ethics (ethica) is grounded since it
does not consider laws for maxims of actions, notably, the practical laws that belong
to ethics as a theory of virtue. That is to say: Kant’s foundational theory of right
abstracts not merely from the nature and empirical content of human needs as well
as from all ends of the power of choice that may be achievable by way of prudential
reasoning concerned with promoting the well-being or happiness of human beings.
It abstracts even from the set of a priori laws of practical reason that specify the
duties that all of us have in virtue of the capacity that each of us by nature has to act
on maxims that we ought to adopt without reference to possible external constraint
by another agent or other agents. Kant’s theory of the metaphysical foundations of
right therefore treats only the formal conditions under which different subjects whose
powers of choice are, or can be, reciprocally linked can always act freely in conformity
with practical reason’s universal juridical prescription.
The key to understanding how this conformity is possible lies in the necessary
connection between the concept of right and the concept of external compulsion or
coercion (Zwang). According to Kant, the connection at issue is analytic: ‘there is
connected with right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce
someone who infringes upon it’ 30 (6:231). Consquently, Kant holds that strict right
itself is representable as ‘the possibility of a fully reciprocal use of coercion that is
consistent with everyone’s freedom in accordance with universal laws’ 31 (6:232). It
is the analytic connection between right and possible coercion that ultimately
grounds the right of the state to punish those who violate the deontic requirements
of strict right; and it is the representation of the possibility of a fully reciprocal use of
coercion that makes the punishment of those who violate these formal requirements
a type of action prescribed by a categorical imperative of juridico-practical reason.
No progress in the public use of reason is possible unless the conditions for the
satisfaction of this imperative are themselves satisfiable.
Returning to the 1797 article on the supposed right to lie, let us focus on two
overarching concerns that Kant’s criticism of Constant is intended to address. First,
there is Kant’s concern to underscore the connection between, on the one hand, the
duty to truthfulness in making statements and, on the other hand, the definition of
29 Handle äußerlich so, daß der freie Gebrauch deiner Willkür mit der Freiheit von jedermann nach einem
allgemeinen Gesetze zusammen bestehen könne,...(6:231).
30 Mithin ist mit dem Rechte zugleich eine Befugniß, den, der ihm Abbruch thut, zu zwingen, nach dem
Satze des Widerspruchs verknüpft. (6:231)
31 Das stricte Recht kann auch als die Möglichkeit eines mit jedermanns Freiheit nach allgemeinen Gesetzen
zusammenstimmenden durchgängigen wechselseitigen Zwanges vorgestellt werden. (6:232)86
right as the consistency (Zusammenstimmung – 8:428) of the freedom of each with
the freedom of everyone in accordance with universal law. The pivotal issue that
Kant wants to be in position to address by means of his criticism of the
consequentialist features of Constant’s thinking is the link between truthfulness
and this definition of external freedom. Second, there is Kant’s concern with the
possibility of progressing, in view of this link,  from the normative concepts and
principles of the metaphysically foundational theory of right to ‘a principle of politics
[ein Grundsatz der Politik]’ that offers the means of solving the problem of ‘how it is
to be arranged that in a society, however large, concord in accordance with principles
of freedom and equality is maintained (namely, by means of a representative
system)’32 (8:429).
With regard to the first of these overarching concerns, Kant categorically insists
on taking one basic position. Even in the event that no one in particular is wronged
by an act of lying, the agent who lies nevertheless violates ‘the principle of right
with respect to all unavoidable necessary statements in general’ (8:427). For Kant,
this is as much as to say that a wrong is thereby ‘inflicted upon humanity in general
[die Menscheit überhaupt]’ (8:426) even if an act of lying (and thus the lying agent)
‘escapes being subject to punishment by accident’ 33 (8:427). It is specifically in view
of the notion of the infliction of wrong on humanity in general that we are to
understand the relation between lying and juridical wrongdoing. As Kant states
32 Um nun von einer Metaphysik des Rechts (welche von allen Erfahrungsbedingungen abstrahiert) zu
einem Grundsatze der Politik (welcher diese Begriffe auf Erfahrungsfälle anwendet) und vermittelst
dieses zur Auflösung einer Aufgabe der letzteren dem allgemeinen Rechtsprincip gemäß zu gelangen:
wird der Philosoph 1) ein Axiom, d.i. einen apodiktisch gewissen Satz, der unmittelbar aus der Definition
des äußern Rechts (Zusammenstimmung der Freiheit eines Jeden mit der Freiheit von Jedermann nach
einem allgemeinen Gesetze) hervorgeht, 2) ein Postulat (des äußeren öffentlichen Gesetzes, als vereinigten
Willens Aller nach dem Princip der Gleichheit, ohne welche keine Freiheit von Jedermann Statt haben
würde), 3. ein Problem geben, wie es anzustellen sei, daß in einer noch so großen Gesellschaft dennoch
Eintracht nach Principien der Freiheit und Gleichheit erhalten werde (nämlich vermittelst eines
repräsentativen Systems); welches dann ein Grundsatz der Politik sein wird, deren Veranstaltung und
Anordnung nun Decrete enthalten wird, die, aus der Erfahrungserkenntniß der Menschen gezogen, nur
den Mechanism der Rechtsverwaltung, und wie dieser zweckmäßig einzurichten sei, beabsichtigen. –
Das Recht muß nie der Politik, wohl aber die Politik jederzeit dem Recht angepaßt werden. (8:429)
33 Wahrhaftigkeit in Aussagen, die man nicht umgehen kann, ist formale Pflicht des Menschen gegen Jeden,
es mag ihm oder einem Andern daraus auch noch so großer Nachtheil erwachsen; und ob ich zwar dem,
welcher mich ungerechterweise zur Aussage nöthigt, nicht Unrecht thue, wenn ich sie verfälsche, so
thue ich doch durch eine solche Verfälschung, die darum auch (obzwar nicht im Sinn des Juristen) Lüge
genannt werden kann, im wesentlichsten Stücke der Pflicht überhaupt Unrecht: d.i. ich mache, so viel an
mir ist, daß Aussagen (Declarationen) überhaupt keinen Glauben finden, mithin auch alle Rechte, die
auf Verträgen gegründet werden, wegfallen und ihre Kraft einbüßen; welches ein Unrecht ist, das der
Menschheit überhaupt zugefügt wird.
Die Lüge also, bloß als vorsetzlich unwahre Declaration gegen einen andern Menschen definirt, bedarf
nicht des Zusatzes, daß sie einem Anderen schaden müsse; wie die Juristen es zu ihrer Definition
verlangen (mendacium est falsiloquium in praeiudicium alterius). Denn sie schadet jederzeit einem
Anderen, wenn gleich nicht einem andern Menschen, doch der Menschheit überhaupt, indem sie die
Rechtsquelle unbrauchbar macht.
Diese gutmüthige Lüge kann aber auch durch einen Zufall (casus) strafbar werden nach bürgerlichen
Gesetzen; was aber bloß durch den Zufall der Straffälligkeit entgeht, kann auch nach äußeren Gesetzen
als Unrecht abgeurtheilt werden (8:426-427).87
toward the end of his article, the problem presented by lying is ‘not the danger of
harming (accidentally [zufälligerweise]) but of doing wrong, as would happen if I
make the duty of truthfulness, which ... constitutes the supreme juridical principle
in statements, into a conditional duty subordinate to other considerations’ 34 (8:429).
In setting forth the unconditional duty of truthfulness, the supreme juridical principle
in statements specifies a formal condition or requirement of external freedom that
must be fulfilled if the infliction of wrong on humanity in general is to be avoided.
Yet given the way in which Kant draws the distinction between causing harm
and doing harm, and consequently between harming and wrongdoing, we have seen
that it is possible for an agent to lie and yet not to be the author of an event in (or by)
which a person is wronged by that agent, even when this particular person suffers
both harm and wrongdoing as the result of the agent’s act of lying. In view of this
possibility, then, we have to ask whether Kant’s basic position on wrong done to
humanity in general by an act of lying is supportable with respect to all conditions
under which actions can accord with the universal principle of right as a principle of
external freedom.
As far as it concerns acts of lying that fall within the purview of the theory of
right, Kant’s position does seem to require significant qualification, if not substantial
revision. For one thing, as we have seen, the blanket juridical prohibition against
lying under all possible conditions of action seems to be incompatible with Kant’s
use of his own criteria for the conceptual determination of wrongdoing in the
specifically juridical sense of that term. Moreover, given this determination, it is
exceedingly difficult to grasp how an apparent violation of the juridical principle of
truthfulness could inflict wrong on humanity in general if, under certain conditions
of action, no human being in particular can be wronged by an act of lying – at least
not given the type of conditions illustrated by the door-knocking scenario treated
earlier. How I could possibly do wrong to humanity if, under extreme conditions of
the type described, it is impossible for anyone in particular ever to be subject to
wrong by me in virtue of my wrong-preventing act of lying? Furthermore, if it is not
clear how I could violate the principle of truthfulness as a principle of right when I
can do wrong to no one in particular, it is also unclear how I could avoid doing wrong
to humanity in general if I simply allow a preventable wrong to be done to a particular
person. As a principle of strict right, the principle of truthfulness proscribes a type
of action by which wrong is done to humanity in general. But like every other principle
of strict right, such a principle of truthfulness requires that an agent must do no
34 »Ein als wahr anerkannter (ich setze hinzu: a priori anerkannter, mithin apodiktischer) Grundsatz muß
niemals verlassen werden, wie anscheinend auch Gefahr sich dabei befindet,« sagt der Verfasser. Nur
muß man hier nicht die Gefahr (zufälligerweise) zu schaden, sondern überhaupt Unrecht zu thun
verstehen: welches geschehen würde, wenn ich die Pflicht der Wahrhaftigkeit, die gänzlich unbedingt
ist und in Aussagen die oberste rechtliche Bedingung ausmacht, zu einer bedingten und noch andern
Rücksichten untergeordneten mache und, obgleich ich durch eine gewisse Lüge in der That niemanden
Unrecht thue, doch das Princip des Rechts in Ansehung aller unumgänglich nothwendigen Aussagen
überhaupt verletze (formaliter, obgleich nicht materialiter, Unrecht thue): welches viel schlimmer ist als
gegen irgend Jemanden eine Ungerechtigkeit begehn, weil eine solche That nicht eben immer einen
Grundsatz dazu im Subjecte voraussetzt (8:429).88
wrong to anyone, even if it happens that someone is thereby harmed. Thus, it is not
clear how I could fail to violate the principle of truthfulness, insofar as it serves as a
juridical principle that prohibits wrongdoing, if I act in such a way that I am willing
to become the author (or co-author) of an event in which a person is wronged so
that I can avoid being the author of an event by which that same person might be
harmed. For if I do become the author of an event in which a person is wronged in as
much as I cause this event as the way to avoid being the author of an event involving
possible harm to another, then how can I possibly fail to be an agent who causes
wrong to be done to that person? And if I do cause wrong to be done to this same
person by becoming the author of an event in which someone is wronged, how can
this wrong not be my punishable doing as long as wrongdoing, understood as the
infliction of wrong on humanity in general, is inflicted in doing and by doing wrong
to particular persons? As we have seen, event authorship is not a sufficient condition
for liability to punishment if the event by which someone is harmed is not the event
in which that person is wronged by the author of this same event. But this does not
entail – or at least does not obviously imply – that the author of such an event does
no wrong if the event that he authors is just the event in which, and by which, he
causes foreseeable and preventable wrong to be done to someone.
I suppose that the clarification of these conceptual and metaphysical issues
presupposes the explication of Kant’s idea of humanity in general; the interpretation
of the various uses of this idea in Kant’s theory of right as well as in his ethics; and
finally, the critical assessment of these uses in view of the problem of attributing
intrinsic moral significance to the distinction between doing wrong to another and
allowing wrong to be done to another. But we do not need to become involved in
any of this here. For the various difficulties involved in sorting out those issues should
not keep us from discerning an implication of Kant’s account of the juridical principle
of truthfulness that is clearly defensible on the basis of the analytic connection
between the Kantian concept of right and the concept of the reciprocal use of external
coercion. Granted this connection, the interesting upshot of this account emerges
when we consider conditions under which everyone is unavoidably wronged by a
public act of lying. Let us therefore try to understand Kant’s basic juridical position
on lying and truthfulness in connection with his second overarching concern, that
is, his concern with the possible conformity of politics with the deontic requirements
of strict right. In particular, let us try to answer this question: what follows if we
bring Kant’s basic position into its proper alignment with the principle of politics
that requires a representative system? We can best discern what follows if we
consider the extreme-case scenario in which a public act of lying affecting the
lawgiving capacity of this type of political system utterly excludes, as the result of
that act, the possibility that politics could be accommodated to right.
Take a historical situation in which appointed administrative agents of a state’s
executive authority (Gewalt = potestas) obtain the authorization to exercise the
power of that authority in a particular way – to engage in the pre-emptive external
use of military force for the purpose of expanding a state’s economic power and
international political influence, for example – on the basis of an act (or acts) of lying89
to persons representing that same state’s legislative or judicial authorities. In this
case, violation of the juridical principle of truthfulness does two things when judged
from the standpoint of practical reason’s universally prescriptive role. First, in virtue
of that very violation, wrong is in fact inflicted upon everyone whose lawgiving
capacity is represented by particular persons who have legislative or judicial
functions in a state. Second, wrong is thereby inflicted upon humanity in general by
reason of the universally prescriptive import of the fundamental law that requires
the accommodation of politics to right (see 8:429). If the administrative liar’s maxim
to achieve an end by means of an act of lying is what furnishes the grounds for
legislative action or judicial decisions, it becomes impossible to determine whether
actions of this type conform to the principle that an action is right if, and only if, it
can coexist with the law-conforming freedom of everyone. In other words, it becomes
impossible for particular agents representing the legislative or judicial authority
of the state to exercise their respective functions in such a way that state action
can necessarily be in accordance with a universal law. Thus, since any action’s
possible coexistence with everyone’s law-conforming freedom furnishes precisely
the definitional account of right action in terms of which the accommodation of
politics to right (as opposed to the accommodation of right to politics) must
be understood, the administrative agent’s act of lying inflicts wrong on humanity
in general by making it impossible for the legislative or judicial exercise of state
power to occur in accordance with the universal law that requires the accommodation
of politics to right.
What juridical consequence, then, ought to be drawn from the violation of the
juridical principle of truthfulness when a public act of lying not only can cause harm
but also necessarily makes the liar the author of an event (or events) in which all
persons are wronged, including all persons belonging to the particular representative
system the rightful lawgiving and law-specifying capacity of which is impermissibly
restricted by that act? In this case, the act of lying is not merely a punishable action
in the event that wrong is done by a lying agent. It is an act by which a lying agent
necessarily ought to be subject to prosecution and punishment because that agent
necessarily does wrong in and by lying. That is because it is impossible for an agent
not to be the author of an event by which everyone is wronged when this event –
the very act of lying to the legislator or the judicial authority in the representative
system of a people – makes the accommodation of politics to the principle of right
impossible. In this event, then, the act itself demands prosecution on the strength
of the analytic connection between strict right and the reciprocal use of coercion
consistent with everyone’s freedom.
A juridically impeachable act of wrongdoing categorically requires impeachment
and prosecution. Such, in Kantian terms, is the most basic possibility condition –
the conditio sine qua non – for any progress of reason from the theory of right to
politics in the event that the juridical principle of truthfulness is violated by a political
act of lying to the legislative or judicial authorities in a system representing a people.
The Kantian line of assault against the political lie, however, by no means ceases at
this point. For the demand to accommodate politics to the principle of right can also90
be shown to apply to international law when the use of politically useful lies within
a given state is what makes possible the execution of certain policy measures that
are contrary to principles of right. Consider again the pre-emptive external use of
military force to engage in hostilities as a prime example. To ground and justify this
use by means of a useful lie – a lie that precludes the determination of a policy’s
consistency with principles of right – is a type of action that opposes the fundamental
exeundum requirement of morally practical reason: the commandment to put an end
to the condition of war represented by the concept of the juridical state of nature.
The import of this requirement and the consequences of its violation become
evident when the Thrasymachean ‘advantage of the stronger’ is translated into the
conceptual universe of later traditions of Western juridical thought, especially the
tradition stemming from the twelfth-century enlightenment’s introduction of the
concept of subjective right  35. According to Kant, the ‘right of the stronger’ (Metaphysik
der Sitten 6:344.9) characterizes the condition of humanity in which the will to remain
in a state of lawless freedom overrides, or simply disregards, the prescriptively
‘irresistabile veto of morally practical reason: ‘there is to be no war’ 36 (6:354.20-21).
Acting contrary to this categorical demand is, in Kantian terms, the doing of wrong
in the very highest degree37. And the use of the political lie to make possible this
highest degree of wrongdoing by disguising the real imperial ends of state policy
that embodies the right of the stronger makes the executors of such policy the authors
of events in which the highest degree of wrong is necessarily done to all human
beings – to those living, to those not yet born, and, arguably, even to those long
since dead. In the event of wrongdoing of this degree and scope, the principles of
public right in general and of ius gentium in particular furnish a fully sufficient
normative basis for prosecutorial warrant. Moreover, and just as importantly, in the
event that contractually established international courts of justice actually exist,
the institutional framework for prosecuting the lie-supported pursuit of the advantage
of the stronger is in fact given and ought to be brought to bear for the purpose of
actual prosecution. The particular warrant for and the special implications of these
last conclusions, however, provide the topic of another paper.
In concluding this paper, I suppose that I should say something about the title
of my talk. What do my considerations on Plato and Kant have to do with
“truthiness”?38 Not all that much – or at least not all that much directly. Truthiness,
like bullshit from high places, undoubtedly causes untold harm worldwide as the
result of damage to a national political culture. But unless its authors overstep the
boundary markers furnished by definitions of lying in positive law (state-internal or
international), we are pretty much left with the traditional remedies in hand, no
35 For a detailed account of this tradition from the humanistic jurisprudence of the twelfth century through
Grotius, see Brian Tierney’s The Idea of Natural Rights: Studies on Natural Rights, Natural Law, and
Church Law, 1150-1625 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997).
36 Nun spricht die moralisch-praktische Venunft in uns ihr unwiderstehliches Veto aus: Es soll kein Krieg
sein.
37 See Metaphysik der Sitten 6: 307-308, 344, 350-351, 354-355.
38 See note 1 above.91
matter how far they may limp along behind the technological means of deception
that underlie so many contemporary forms of myth-making. The available instruments
for remedy through the public use of reason, however, are tools that most anybody
can still wield. We find them in the shed and in the kitchen. Bullshit has to be shoveled
right back up to where the sun don’t shine on bulls. Truthiness has to be pried apart,
cut thin, and exposed for what it is: the partisan performances of the auxiliaries
of the stronger. Comedy Central already provides both excellent examples and decent
moral support for these activities. Does philosophy still have a special role to play
in this regard? I think it may. Historically, one of philosophy’s most important
public roles has been to remind us of this cold fact of social nature: it’s almost always
the strongest who are in the strongest position to act on a maxim of self-justifying
deceit that in fact boils down to nothing more than ‘The bigger the lie, the better
it is.’ No matter how far reason regresses in its public uses, we can still know
that there is nothing noble, much less generous, about that. And we can also
understand why punishment is imperative when impeachable wrong is done.
Truth has consequences.